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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k) as a case poured over from the
Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
In addition to Appellants' statements of issues, the following
also are at issue:
A.

Whether

the

trial

court,

having

found

and

held

that

EnviroPak was the alter-ego of Surgical, erred in terminating the
accrual of damages as of the date EnviroPak's business activities
ended,

rather

contract

than

awarding

damages

term when

Surgical

has

through

continued

to

the

entire

exist

agreed

during

all

relevant times.
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. Grayson Roper Ltd. v.
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989).
B.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Diston

was not able to recover damages for the agreed-upon, and fixed amount
of, automobile allowance absent evidence of the amount for which the
automobile would be used for the business.
Standard of Review:

Clear error.

Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The only statute at issue herein is the statute of frauds, Utah
Code Annotated §25-5-4(1) and §25-5-8.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
A.

Nature of the Case.

Mr. John Diston, Plaintiff below and

Appellee/Cross-Appellant herein ("Mr. Diston"), generally accepts the
"Statement of the Case" contained in Appellants' Brief.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Mr. Diston accepts the Appellants'

Statement of "Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below," except as
to the following additional points:
Mr. Diston filed a notice of cross-appeal on December 1, 1993
(R539)1.

EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc. ("EnviroPak") and Surgical

Technologies, Inc., formerly known as Pinnacle Environmental, Inc.
("Surgical"), Defendants below and Appellants/Cross-Appellees herein
(collectively, "Defendants") have not addressed Mr. Diston's crossappeal in their brief.

Mr. Diston cross-appeals upon two issues:

First, while the trial court found that EnviroPak was merely the
alter ego of Surgical, the court did not award damages for the full
contract period during which Surgical and/or its alter-ego EnviroPak
were doing business; Second, the court declined to award damages for
an agreed fixed sum of a car allowance on the rationale that no
evidence was before the court as to the percentage of time or use Mr.
Diston was required to use the car in connection with Mr. Diston's
employment.

1

Citations to the findings of fact are denoted "FF,"
followed by its paragraph number.
References to exhibits are
denoted "Ex," followed by the number.
Other citations to the
Record are denoted "R," followed by the page number and other
identifying information as appropriate. The main three contract
exhibits, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the
Judgment are attached hereto as Addenda.
30641 .DI783.2
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C.

Statement of Facts. In late 1990 and early 1991r Frederick

P. Ninow ("Mr. Ninow") was employed with a company named Professional
Medical

(FF6).

During this time, Mr. Ninow began planning and

efforts for the manufacture and marketing of pre-packaged surgical
supply

packets

featuring

principal

components

to be

laundered,

sterilized and prepacked for repeated use in surgical and other
health care procedures (FF7, R581).

During his process of planning,

Mr. Ninow became acquainted with, and approached, John Diston ("Mr.
Diston") for ideas and suggestions; and this developed into Mr.
Ninow's

determination

(FF8,9;

R580-582)

.

to form his own company

for that purpose

At that time, Mr. Diston was employed by Holy

Cross Hospital as Director of Peri-Operative Services (FF5; R24);
he was happy

in that

evaluations (R579).

job and had exceptional

and

job performance

As a result of the discussions, Mr. Ninow and

Mr. Diston ultimately agreed that Mr. Diston would be a key employee
of the company, to serve as Director/Operations, which included being
vice-president of quality control and production {FF10;

R604, 639,

751, 762).
In the Summer

of

1991, to obtain

funding

to proceed

with

marketing and sale of these products, Mr. Ninow met with principals
of Surgical Technologies, Inc. ("Surgical") (FF12),

a publicly-traded

company having other subsidiaries (R665-66,688,690).

These meetings

led to agreement for Surgical to form EnviroPak Medical Products,
Inc.

("EnviroPak"), as a wholly-owned

manufacture

30641. DI783.2

and

market

the

products
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subsidiary
(FF13).

of Surgical to
Pursuant

to

documentation

prepared

by

Surgical's

counsel

and

at

Surgical's

direction, EnviroPak was incorporated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Surgical

(FF14,16).

Mr. Ninow and Surgical, on September 19, 1991, entered into an
Organization Agreement to establish EnviroPak

(FF15;

Exl).

This

Organization Agreement was unique as far as Surgical's dealings with
its other subsidiaries (R702).

The Organization Agreement provided,

among other things, that Mr. Ninow would be director, chairman of the
boardf and president of EnviroPak and that EnviroPak would enter into
an Executive Employment Agreement with Mr. Ninow contemporaneous with
the execution of the Organization Agreement (FF16;
in

the

negotiations,

insisted

autonomy in operation (FF16;

that

R703,

EnviroPak

750)}

Exl).

Mr. Ninow,

have

considerable

and such a provision was

inserted in the Organization Agreement (R703;

Exl,13).

At the same time as the Organization Agreement was prepared, Mr.
Ninow, Surgical and EnviroPak agreed upon an Executive Employment
Agreement in the form normally used by Surgical (FF19;

R757;

Ex2).

That Executive Employment Agreement provides, among other things,
that

Mr. Ninow would

serve

at

the pleasure

additional duties provided by, either
that company

(FF20;Ex2).

of, and with

such

EnviroPak or any parent of

It further provides that Mr. Ninow was

employed as president, as director, as chairman of the board of
directors, and as chief operating executive, with "all of the rights,
powers and obligations normally associated with such position"
Ex2) .

30641. DI783.2
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(FF20;

In order to enter into the agreements among Surgical, EnviroPak
and

Mr. Ninow, Todd

Crosland

(son

of

Surgical's

president

and

chairman of the board) signed both the Organization Agreement and the
Executive Employment Agreement as "president" of EnviroPakf absent
any resolution of the directors, but with Defendants accepting his
authority

(R688,696-97).

On the same date the Organization Agreement was signed, Surgical
prepared and distributed a public news release concerning EnviroPak's
formation (FF21;

Ex5).

Surgical always tried to make sure its press

releases were accurate (R692A),

and it was the purpose of that press

release to tell people what had happened with EnviroPak (R699) . That
public

release

referred

to

Mr. Mr. Ninow's

role

on

behalf

of

EnviroPak as president (as referred to in the Organization Agreement
and in the Executive Employment Agreement) and as CEO (as referred to
only in the Executive Employment Agreement) (FF21;

R704;

Ex5).

During all times leading to EnviroPak's incorporation, Mr. Ninow
kept Mr. Diston informed, expecting and understanding that Mr. Diston
would be employed as a key EnviroPak employee (FF22) .
also

showed Mr. Diston a portion of the Organization

Mr. Nincw
Agreement

showing Mr. Ninow's offices as directorf chairman and president of
EnviroPak (R602,

642,

647)

as well as a copy of his own Executive

Employment Agreement which also showed Mr. Ninow as chief operating
executive

(R760).

On September

19 f

1991, the same day as the signing of the

Organization Agreement and of publication of the public news release,

30641.DI783.2
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Mr. Ninow, without knowledge of Surgical principals, delivered to Mr.
Diston a signed Letter of Intent to Enter Employment Agreement (the
"Employment Agreement") (FF23,26;

Ex3).

That Employment Agreement

provided that EnviroPak would employ Mr. Diston for three years
commencing on or before October 31, 1991, and that Mr. Diston would
receive a salary of $72,000 per year payable bi-weekly, would receive
a monthly automobile allowance, would participate in the company's
stock option program, would receive health and accident insurance,
would be reimbursed for business expenses, would participate in the
incentive compensation program, and would receive two weeks paid
vacation (FF27;

Ex3).

Mr. Diston and Mr. Ninow subsequently agreed

and clarified that the automobile allowance was to be a fixed $360.00
per month (FF29;

R603,

647,

760)

and that Mr. Diston's participation

in the stock option program would be for 25,000 shares of the total
100,000 shares allocated from Surgical to EnviroPak for that purpose
(R604,

619,

761).

While Mr. Diston and Mr. Ninow

contemplated

subsequent entry into a more formal agreement, consistent with the
Employment Agreement, both Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston considered the
Employment

Agreement

EnviroPak (FF28,

32;

to be
R760-62,

fully

binding

on Mr. Diston

and

on

773).

Based upon the Organization Agreement and the publication of the
public news release, Pinnacle and EnviroPak had vested Mr. Ninow with
authority as chief operating executive, director, chairman of the
board and president of EnviroPak; it was reasonable for Mr. Diston,

30641. DI783.2
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under these circumstances, to rely upon the authority of Mr. Ninow to
bind EnviroPak under the Employment Agreement
Mr.

Diston, after receipt

(FF33).

of EnviroPak's

signed

Employment

Agreement, accepted the terms of that Agreement and informed Mr.
Ninow that he accepted the agreement (R636,

804)

and that he would
(FF30;

give notice to terminate his employment at Holy Cross Hospital
R606,

762).

On or about October 9, 1991, Mr. Diston, relying upon

the Employment Agreement, notified Holy Cross Hospital of his intent
to terminate his employment effective October 31, 1991 (FF31;

R607;

Ex7).

with

Mr. Diston's

EnviroPak,

and

his

reliance

on

termination

his
of

Employment

employment

Agreement

with

Holy

Hospital, were reasonable under the circumstances (FF34).

Cross

Both Mr.

Ninow and Mr. Diston, the persons who negotiated the Employment
Agreement, have at all times continued to consider the Employment
Agreement

binding

R616,634,643,761,

upon

Mr.

773,

Employment Agreement

Diston

803).

and

EnviroPak,

on

(FF32;

EnviroPak

though,

breached

the

(F526).

After giving notice of termination to Holy Cross Hospital, Mr.
Diston, for the first time, became aware of disputes between Surgical
and

Mr. Ninow

EnviroPak (FF35;
Cross

Hospital

representatives

and

its

effect

R609-10,
if

809).

he could

informed

on Mr.

Diston's

employment

with

As a result, Mr. Diston asked Holy
receive

Mr.

Diston

his
that

job back.
Holy

Cross

Holy
had

Cross
made

arrangements and commitments with other personnel and was not able to
reinstate the job (FF36;

30641.DH83.2

R610-11)

. Mr. Diston subsequently met with

7

Todd B. Crosland and Rockwell P. Schutjer (FF40;

R59-60).

During

discussions, these Surgical and EnviroPak representatives offered Mr.
Diston employment with EnviroPak for $60 f 000 f but without the other
benefits Mr. Diston believed he was entitled to under the Employment
Agreement (FF40).

Moreover, Crosland and Schutjer refused to specify

the nature of the employment duties, refused to consent to any
written agreementf and merely offered an employee-at-will agreement
(FF40;

R615,

(F41).

721).

Accordingly, Mr. Diston declined this "offer"

Under the circumstancesf

Mr. Diston reasonably

EnviroPak's proposed employment-at-will

arrangement

(FF42).

Diston then obtained employment with FHP Health Caref
February 24, 1992 (FF45;
December 31, 1992

R577,

617).

rejected
Mr.

commencing

EnviroPak ceased doing business

(FF43).

The trial court found, as established by the Findings of Fact,
that

Surgical, as the

sole shareholder

of EnviroPak, failed

to

observe the separate corporation structures; provided for EnviroPak
to be seriously undercapitalized, making it illusory and trifling;
did not observe corporate formalities and separateness; was the sole
source of funding for EnviroPak; and retained significant control
over EnviroPak. This resulted in the reasonable and likely potential
of inequitable results (FF37).

As a result, EnviroPak was a hollow

shell and an alter-ego of Surgical (R52 7).
The Court, therefore, held the substantive portions of the
Employment

Agreement

insufficient

30641 .DI783.2

evidence

enforceable,
to

award

(R526)
damages

8

except
for

that

stock

there

was

options

and

incentive bonus (FF49).

There being no evidence as to the amount of

actual car usage to be made in connection with EnviroPak's business,
the court refused to award damages for the agreed-upon monthly car
allowance of $360.00 per month (FF50).
alter-ego

of

Surgical,

the

Court

Since EnviroPak was merely an
ruled

that

both

companies,

therefore, were jointly and severally liable for the damages to Mr.
Diston; but the Court awarded damages only to the date EnviroPak
ceased

business

and not

for the entire term

of the

Employment

Agreement.
The Court entered its final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law on November 16, 1993f entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff
November 18f 1993f in the principal amount of $54f834.60f plus prejudgment and post-judgment interest.

Defendants filed this appeal,

and Mr. Diston cross-appealed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT.
Because the Defendants have failed to marshall the evidence in

support of the trial court's findings of fact, the Defendants have
not met the necessary standard of review and cannot challenge the
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT MR. DISTON'S EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES AN ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT.
Mr. Fred Ninow, on behalf of EnviroPak, and pursuant to his

discussions with John Diston, prepared an employment agreement for

30641. DI783.2
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Mr. Diston's employment with EnviroPak. That agreement, as clarified
by the negotiators, provided for a three year employment term, a
$72,000 annual salary, the times of payment, provisions for potential
raises, a $360.00 per month car allowance, participation in the
company's health insurance program, two weeks paid vacation and
participation in an incentive compensation pool and stock option
program.
that

Both Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston also understood and agreed

Mr.

Diston's

role

at

the

company

would

be

as

director/operations, which included the vice president of quality
control and production.

Mr. Diston, in reliance on that agreement,

terminated his prior employment with Holy Cross Hospital.
The Employment Agreement contains all of the essential elements
of

Mr.

Diston's

employment

enforceable agreement.
who

negotiated

the

with

EnviroPak

and

constitutes

an

Both Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston, the parties

agreement,

have

consistently

considered

the

agreement to be clear and enforceable; and Mr. Diston, in reliance on
the agreement, terminated his employment with Holy Cross Hospital
anticipating his employment with EnviroPak pursuant to the negotiated
Employment Agreement.

The terms of the employment agreement, the

clarification by the parties of the terms not specifically spelled
out (such as details of the amount of the car allowance and of the
number of shares involved in the stock option) and Mr. Diston's
reliance

upon

and

performance

under

the

eliminate any question of unenforceability
frauds.

30641. DI783.2
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Employment

Agreement

under the statute of

Mr. Ninow negotiated the agreement through the authority given
him

by

the Defendants

as president, chief

operating

director, and chairman of the board of EnviroPak.

executive,

These agreed-to

offices cloak Mr. Ninow with both apparent and actual authority to
bind EnviroPak to those agreements, and Mr. Diston reasonably relied
upon Mr. Ninow's authority.
III. THE TRIAL COURT, HAVING FOUND THAT ENVIROPAK WAS THE ALTER-EGO
OF SURGICAL, ERRED IN TERMINATING THE DAMAGES AS OF THE DATE
ENVIROPAK CEASED BUSINESS.
The trial court found that Surgical, as the sole shareholder of
EnviroPak, failed to observe the separate corporations' structure;
provided for EnviroPak to be seriously undercapitalized which made
the existence of EnviroPak illusory and trifling; did not observe
corporate
funding

formalities
for

EnviroPak.

and

EnviroPak;

separateness; was

and

retained

the

sole

significant

source

control

of

over

As a result, EnviroPak was merely a hollow shell and an

alter-ego of Surgical. The court, having determined the existence of
the alter-ego arrangement, though, incorrectly terminated the time
for calculation
business.

of damages

to the date EnviroPak

ceased

to do

Since EnviroPak was merely the alter-ego of Surgical,

Surgical continues to be liable for EnviroPak's obligations under the
Employment Agreement throughout the entire term of the agreement.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO AWARD THE MONTHLY CAR
ALLOWANCE PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT.
Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston agreed that, as part of Mr. Diston's

compensation under the Employment Agreement, Mr. Diston would be paid
a car allowance of $360.00 per month.
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The trial court, though,

incorrectly reading into the contract, wrongfully determined that Mr.
Diston, in order to be entitled to the car allowance, was obligated
to prove the percentage of time of the use of the car in connection
with his employment with EnviroPak.
The courtf with no factual basis to make the determination,
incorrectly determined as a matter of law that the car allowance
required additional evidence and, there being no evidence as to
percentage of usage, refused to enforce that allowance.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT.
Defendants must either accept and rely upon the trial court's
findings of fact in order to challenge its conclusions of law under
the proposed "correction of error" standard of review or they must
directly challenge the trial court's findings of fact under the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review.

In this case, Defendants

approach this appeal as a re-trial by presenting the law as they see
it and asking this Court to apply that law to their version of the
facts.
with

Defendants have presented many facts that are in conflict
the

trial

court's

findings

of

fact,

thereby

implicitly

challenging the trial court's findings of fact and invoking the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review. Defendants cannot prevail on
appeal because they cannot satisfy the applicable standard of review.
The well-established condition to challenging findings of fact
is a complete marshalling of the evidence concerning the findings in
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question. This Court recently summarized this requirement in Robb v.
Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322 (Utah App. 1993), as follows:
As a prerequisite to an appellant's attack on findings of
fact, appellant must marshall all the evidence in support
of the findings and demonstrate "that the evidence,
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefromr is
insufficient to support the findings...." Grayson Roper
Ltd. , v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); See
also
fReid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah
1989).] The marshaling requirement provides the meaningful
and expedient review of facts challenged on appeal. See
Wright v. West side Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2 (Utah
App. 1990).
Robb, 863 P.2d at 1328.
Defendants have provided no basis for this Court to overturn the
facts upon which the trial court based its conclusions of law.
Defendants have not identified the findings of fact that they are
challenging. More importantly, they have not marshalled the evidence
in support of the trial court's findings.
demonstrated

that

the

marshaled

Finally, they have not

evidence,

and

the

reasonable

inferences therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
trial court's findings, is clearly erroneous, i.e., it is against the
clear weight of all such evidence and reasonable inferences.

See

Robb, 863 P.2d at 1327-1328, citing Reid, 776 P.2d at 899-900 and
Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied,
765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).

As a result, the facts as set forth in

the court's findings must be affirmed by this Court. See also,
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).
Defendants have implicitly challenged at least the following
findings of fact upon which the trial court based its conclusions of
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law that are the subject of Defendants' appeal: Mr. Diston was to be
a member of the new company as Director/Operations

(F10,22);

the

Organization Agreementf the Executive Employment Agreement and the
press

release

made

Mr. Ninow

director, chairman

of

the

boardf

president and chief operating executive of EnviroPak, "with all the
rightsf

powers

and

obligations

position" (FF16,20,21);
in operation

(FF16);

normally

associated

with

such

EnviroPak was to have considerable autonomy
Mr. Diston and Mr. Ninow specified that the

agreed-on car allowance would be $360.00 per month (Ff29); Mr. Diston
told Mr. Ninow that he accepted the agreement, that he intended to
give notice to Holy Cross Hospital of his termination, and that he
relied on the Employment Agreement in terminating his Holy Cross
employment (FF30,31);

Mr. Diston and Mr. Ninow have always considered

the Employment Agreement binding (FF32)}

Mr. Ninow believed, from the

agreements with Surgical and EnviroPak, that he had authority to
execute the Employment Agreement (FF24)}
on Mr. Ninow's authority (FF33),

Mr. Diston reasonably relied

and Mr. Diston's reliance on the

Employment Agreement and his terminating his employment with Holy
Cross Hospital were reasonable (FF34)}

Mr. Diston was not aware of

any problems with the agreement until after he gave notice to Holy
Cross (FF35)}
(FF36);

Mr. Diston was not able to get his Holy Cross job back

Surgical failed to observe separate corporate structure and

operation for the two corporations by requiring Mr. Ninow to serve at
the pleasure of the board of either corporation, by being the sole
source
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by

grossly

undercapitalizing

EnviroPakf

by

failing

to

maintain

corporate

formalities

and

separateness, and by creating the potential of inequitable results
(FF37);

and Mr. Diston reasonably rejected the subsequent proposed

"offer" from Surgical and EnviroPak after disputes arose herein

(FF40,41).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT MR. DISTONfS
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES AN ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT.
A.
The Employment Agreement Contains all Essential Elements and is
an Enforceable Contract.
Defendants challenge the Employment Agreement as insufficiently
detailed and lacking essential elements to constitute an enforceable
agreement.

This assertion, though, is contrary to the findings in

this case.

The Defendants' assertion that the Employment Agreement

lacks essential elements and details
court's specific conclusion —

flies in the face of the trial

after hearing the evidence —

that the

Employment Agreement did contain the essential provisions of that
employment arrangement and that it was a valid agreement
It

is

also

significant

that

the

Defendants

agreement before they had even read its terms (R713,

(R526).

rejected
715-17),

that

raises

questions regarding Defendants' credibility as they argue against the
Employment Agreement's supposed indefiniteness or unenforceability,
before

they

had

even

read

its

terms.

Regardless, Defendants'

position ignores the Court's findings as to the written terms of the
agreement itself andf also, the oral understandings and agreements to
clarify it and Mr. Diston's reasonable reliance thereon.
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Mr. Diston's employment agreement with EnviroPak addressed all
the essential elements and economic
employment agreement between parties —

arrangements required

in an

the parties had agreed upon

the three-year term of the agreement, the $72,000 annual salary, the
number and times the annual salary would be paidf potential raisesf
a car allowance, participation in the company's health insurance
program, two weeks paid vacation, and participation in an incentive
compensation pool and stock option program

(FF27).

Prior to Mr.

Diston's acceptance of his Employment Agreement and his giving notice
to Holy Cross Hospital of his termination of that employment, Mr.
Diston and Mr. Ninow agreed that the car allowance was to be $360.00
per

month

(FF29;

R603,647,760).

They

further

agreed

that Mr.

Diston's participation in the stock option program would be for
25,000 shares of the total 100,000 shares allocated from Surgical to
EnviroPak for that purpose
With
testified

such
to

specificity

the

negotiating

(R604,619,761).
in

the

Agreement,

parties, one may

as

undisputedly

fairly

ask

what

essential elements were not agreed to between the parties.
To
require

determine
that

the

the nature
parties'

circumstances be considered.

of

an

intent

employment
and

the

contract,
totality

courts
of

the

Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community

Action Program, 775 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah App. 1989).
Defendants, alleging that the Employment Agreement is only an
agreement to agree, cite Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597 (Utah 1962)
for the proposition that a contract can be enforced only if the
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obligations
writing.

are

set

forth

with

sufficient

definiteness

in

the

In Bunnell, it was argued that there was at most, an

"agreement to agree" because the terms were not set forth with
specificity.

However, the Utah Supreme Court said:

[W]hen the receipt is interpreted under the circumstances
that existed at the time of its creation, and in light of
the conduct and statements of the parties, it is clear that
the transfer of Bunnell's property was intended as part of
the whole agreement. The fact that part of the performance
is that the parties will enter into a contract in the
future does not render the original agreement any less
binding. (Citations omitted).
Bunnell, 368 P.2d at 600.
Furthermore, it is well settled that an agreement to make a
written contact, where the terms are mutually understood and agreed
to

in

all

respects, is as binding

as

a more

detailed

written

agreement would have been were it subsequently accepted.
Anderson v. Board of Trustees, 681 P.2d 1326, 1331 (Wy. 1984).
if

a contract

contains

a promise

to

agree, its

Even

enforceability

depends on the relative importance and severability of the matters
left to the future and is a question of degree to be settled by
determining whether the terms to be decided in the future are so
essential

to

the

bargain

that

to

enforce

the

promise

strictly

according to the settled terms would make the arrangement unfair.
"Where the matters left for the future are unessential, each party
will be forced to accept a reasonable determination
Engineering v. North American Aviation, 420 P.2d
1966).

713, 720 (Cal.

See also, Gilbert v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 657 P.2d 1

(Idaho 1983) .
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B.
Both Parties who Negotiated the Employment Agreement Intended,
and Consider, the Agreement to be Binding.
The trial court found, upon consideration of all testimony and
evidence, that the parties who negotiated the Employment Agreement
intended it to be enforceable and, indeed, continue to consider it to
be enforceable and binding (FF32;

R616,

634,

643,

761,

773,

803).

This case, therefore, differs from the normal dispute wherein one of
the

actual

enforceability.

negotiating

parties

disputes

an

agreement's

Defendants in this case, attempting to overcome the

negotiating parties' contrary testimony, take selected portions of
that testimony out of context to assert that the negotiating parties
really did not mean what they say they meant.

Defendants, for

example, quote selected testimony referring to the expectation that
a subsequent, more formal, form of the agreement would be prepared.
In doing so, Defendants ignore the consistent testimony that the
Employment Agreement was considered binding and that any subsequent
document was not a renegotiation of terms but, rather, would be
solely to state the already agreed terms into a more formal form
(R634).

Defendants ignore the fact that, if Mr. Diston did not

consider

the agreement

enforceable, he would

existing job with which he was happy (R579).

not have quit

his

Defendants, quoting

selected testimony of Mr. Diston, also ignore Mr. Diston's other
testimony:

Q
(By Mr. Sabin)
What was your attitude, as far as the
agreement that you had entered into with Fred Ninow?
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A
I told — I made the comment to them at that time that this
did not spell out what is in my agreement. This is the agreement
that they need to live up to. . . (R616)
Q
Now, when Mr. Ninow gave you the letter of intent, and I
think you have testified it was some time within a day or two of
September 20th; is that right?
A

Right.

Q Did you contemplate at that time that there would be a more
detailed agreement entered into?
A
Uh—yes.
I felt with the provisions that were in our
original agreement, yes.
Q And so you expected a written agreement at some point in the
future?
A

Yes.

I felt that a little bit more formalized, yes.

Q
You testified this morning, I think, that you and Fred
discussed it right then that same day that he gave you the letter of
intent?
A

Well, of course.

Q

And you discussed a car allowance and all those things?

A

Of course.

Q Why didn't you just write them down on the letter of intent,
at that time?
A I felt it was a legal document and I didn't want to scribble
on that document. (R634)
Q And did you then make inquiries yourself about whether you
would be employed on the terms set forth in your letter of intent?
A

No.

I assumed that I would be.

(R643)

Defendants also ignore Mr. Ninow's similar testimony which is
consistent with Mr. Diston's understanding:
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Q
Was there any other discussion with John concerning the
letter of intent?
A Yes. We discussed that it would. I showed him a copy of my
employment agreement, and I told him that we would eventually have
some type of another document that would be exactly like mine or very
similar to mine, with some changes, of course, reflecting the
arrangement.
Q Would it have changed the terms of what was in this letter of
intent?
A.

No.

(R760)

C.
The Statute of Frauds Does Not Render the Employment Agreement
Unenforceable.
Defendants argue and, indeed, seem to imply that as a matter of
law,

that

the

statute

Employment Agreement.

of

frauds

precludes

enforcement

of

the

Defendants ignore the pertinent language of

the statute of frauds:
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing,
signed by the party to be charged with the agreement . . .
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-4 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Defendants' assertion as to applicability of the statute of
frauds also ignores the exception to the statute of frauds through
Mr. Diston's part performance of the Employment Agreement.

The

pertinent language is:
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific
performance of agreements in case of part performance
thereof.
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-8.
Mr. Diston quit his job with Holy Cross Hospital in order to
begin his employment with EnviroPak (FF30,31)
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, and was unable to get

that

job back

problem.

(FF35,36),

when

he

later discovered

there was

a

Even absent the specificity of the written agreementf this

partial performance "allows a court of equity to enforce an oral
agreement, if it has been partially performed, notwithstanding the
statute."

Martin v. Scholl, 678, P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983).

The writing which evidences the parties' intent and entry into
an enforceable agreement does not have to be a perfect written
agreement.

In C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923 (Utah App.

1988), this Court enforced a finder's agreement despite protestations
that the statute of frauds precluded its enforcement because of
ambiguities in the agreement.

This Court stated:

In the present case, the written contract concerning
the finder's agreement between the parties was a sufficient
"note or memorandum" of the parties' agreement to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds provision of Section 25-5-4(5). The
contract includes the critical terms of the finder's
agreement: it identifies the finder, the finder's clients,
the property owner who will owe a commission to the finder
if a transaction is closed with any of the finder's
clients, and the commission rate . . . . [t]his agreement
is ambiguous in one respect, namely, whether it applies to
all properties sold by the owner to the finder's clients or
just to certain properties.
Finding such an agreement to be a "sufficient note or
memorandum, is not inconsistent with the Statute of
Frauds." As one commentator has recognized:
[N]o writing or memorandum can ever be the
complete and perfect witness sufficient in
itself to establish the contract and its terms

It
seems
clear
that
parole
evidence
admissible to explain and apply a note
memorandum of an oral contract within
statute
of
frauds
whenever
it would
admissible for the purpose of interpreting
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is
or
the
be
or

determining the operation of an integrated
contract or a writing that purports to be the
operative expression of the will of its creator.
Indeed,
oral
evidence
is
admitted
with
considerably greater liberality in cases under
the statute than in cases of
integrated
contracts.

If the contract is ambiguous, "extrinsic evidence as
to the parties' intent must be received and considered in
an effort to glean what the parties actually agreed to."
(Citations omitted) C.J. Realty, Inc., 758 P.2d at 928929.
It is illustrative to sample other Utah cases in which the
courts have found "ambiguous" contracts to be binding:

Barker v.

Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987) [upholding an earnest money
agreement permitting extraneous evidence to specify the property
description];

Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock

Co., Inc., 706 P. 2d 1028 (Utah 1985) [reversing the lower court's
holding of unenforceability and remanding for findings of fact]; Reid
v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) [enforcing a realty sale contract
despite lack of specificity in property descriptions]; Estate of
Bonnie, 600 P.2d 548 (Utah 1979) [sustaining the quieting of title by
considering together three receipts as a sufficient memoranda to
satisfy the statute of frauds and permitting the exact description of
property to be determined by parole evidence];

Bunnell, supra,

[upholding an earnest money receipt when part of the performance was
to be entered into in the future];

Ney v. Harrison, 299 P.2d 1114

(Utah 1956) [upholding a commission under an earnest money receipt
and a listing agreement after considering the oral agreement for
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payment of commission];

Abba v. Smyth, 59 P. 756 (1899) [admitting

parole evidence to permit enforcement

of an oral agreement

for

employment].
Similar cases from other jurisdictions are also instructive. In
Air Service Co. v. Sheehan, 594 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Nevada 1979), the
court addressed a situation analogous to the case at bar.
parties had negotiated a contract to employ the plaintiff.

The

And the

plaintiff, in reliance upon that contractual agreementf had quit his
job.

Subsequentlyf the defendant refused to sign the documents and

perform part of the contract.
reached

a

complete

oral

The court found that the parties had

agreement

by

which

they

were

bound.

Likewisef in Sucia v. Amfac Dist, 675 P.2d 1333 (Ariz. App. 1983),
the defendants argued thatf because an employment agreement did not
detail the services to be performed or specify whether the employee
was considered full or part-time, there was no meeting of the minds.
The parties had agreed on a salary of $40,000 per year, a car, group
health and life insurance and 30 percent of the stock.

The court

held that employment contracts need not detail every condition of the
employment and that the contract was sufficiently definite to be
enforceable.
Defendants' supporting cases, contrary to the case at hand,
arise where there was no written memorandum or where the contracts
lacked essential elements. See, e.g.,

Machan Hamshire Properties,

Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Development Co., 779 P.2d 230 (Utah
App. 1989), [no written memorandum acknowledging or recognizing an
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oral contract];

Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320 (Utah App.

1988) [no enforcement of an easement or price absent a written memo];
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982) [solely an oral contract
to sell real property]; Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Irving Place
Associates, Inc., 622 P.2d 784 (Utah 1980) [clear evidence that the
parties

did

not

intend

written commitment];

legal

consequences

absent

future

formal

Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497

(Utah 1980) [refusal to enforce rights not supported by a contract];
Davison v. Robbins, 517 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1973), [lands not specified];
Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d

427

(Utah 1961) f

[purported

"side

agreement" absent written memorandum]; Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining
Co. , 242 P.2d 578 (Utah 1952) [oral sublease without rent specified];
Collette v. Goodrich, 231 P.2d 730 (Utah 1951) [oral agreement only];
Beehive Brick v. Robinson Brick Company, 780 P.2d 827 (Ct. App. Utah
1989) f [order not authenticated by other party].
Accordingly, Defendants' authorities are not persuasive in the
present case.
D.
Mr. Ninow Had Both Actual and Apparent Authority to Bind
EnviroPak, Making it Reasonable for Mr. Diston to Rely Upon Mr.
Ninow's Authority.
It was reasonable, as the trial court found

(FF33) , for Mr.

Diston to rely upon the authority of Mr. Ninow because he was clothed
with all indicia of the authority to control and bind EnviroPak; that
is, he was identified as its president, director, chairman of the
board of directors and chief operating executive.

Mr. Ninow had

showed Mr. Diston the relevant part of the Organization Agreement
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and, alsof his own Employment Agreement (R602,642,647,760)

.

For this

reason, Mr. Diston could reasonably rely upon Mr. Ninow's authority
and, because of Mr. Ninow's actual and apparent agency on behalf of
EnviroPak,

could

rely

upon

the

legitimacy

of

the

Employment

Agreement.

The court did, in fact, conclude from the evidence that

Mr. Ninow in this case did have the apparent authority, and Mr.
Diston

relied

on that

Agreement (R526).

authority,

to

enter

into

the

Employment

The evidence fully supported those findings.
(FF16;

Mr. Ninow insisted that EnviroPak be largely autonomous
R703,750).

That

he

had

prevailed

and

obtained

concurrence

by

Surgical was reflected in both the Organization Agreement and the
Executive

Employment

Agreement,

whereby

Mr.

Ninow

was

granted

virtually unlimited authority as president, director, chairman of the
board of directors and chief operating executive "with all of the
rights,

powers

position."

and

obligations

normally

associated

with

in business

and

such

(Ex2).

Given the Defendants' sophistication

their

counsel's preparation of the agreements with their approval, it can
be presumed that the degree of autonomy and power of authority given
Mr. Ninow were not lightly considered but, rather, were integral
parts of the business relationship.

Hence, Surgical and EnviroPak

deferred or acquiesced to Mr. Ninow's important powers and authority
allowing him to undertake such actions as executing the Employment
Agreement.

Surgical's counsel prepared the Organization Agreement

and the Executive Employment Agreement, which has been negotiated
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between Surgical and Mr. Ninow and which empowered Mr. Ninow to take
actions

(FF14).

EnviroPak

Surgical also publicized Mr. Ninow's role with

(FF21;Ex5).

Surgical, a publicly traded company with

various subsidiaries, presumably had both sophisticated principals
and counsel.

One may fairly presume that Surgical's principals and

legal counsel intended that, and knewf the language in the agreements
would control.

The Defendants, therefore, have a hollow ring to

their argument that they had nothing to do with Mr. Diston relying on
Mr. Ninow's authority.

The Defendants lit the fuse and now complain

about the explosion.
The Defendants' argument as to Mr. Ninow's supposed lack of
authority is particularly disingenuous when it is remembered that
Surgical itself had previously recognized Todd Crosland's authority
as president to sign on behalf of EnviroPak, absent any resolution by
the board of Directors

(the board not even yet being formed) and

absent his holding any other office in the corporation at that time.
(R696-97).

Yet Defendants dispute the binding

signature of the

person who the Defendants agreed was the president and director and
chairman of the board and chief executive officer of EnviroPak.
Ignoring,

for

sake

of

argument,

the

Defendant's

prior

recognition of Todd Crosland's authority as president to sign the
agreements with Mr. Ninow, and if Mr. Ninow had simply held a single
office, such as president, Defendants might have some argument as to
the scope of his authority.

In some jurisdictions, the president of

a corporation has no authority to enter into employment contracts or
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agencies merely by virtue of his office.

In other jurisdictions,

though, the president has prima facie authority to make a contract on
behalf of the corporation for the employment of the services of
others.

For instance, the Colorado Supreme Court has stated:

As to defendants' contention that Reed made the promise to
pay the $150.00 per month personally, this record is to the
contrary. He at all times was president of the defendant
corporation and as its principal administrative officer
bound the company for activities within the scope of his
authority which would include the hiring of employees.
(Citations omitted).
Skvland Food Corp. v. Meier, 382 P.2d 996, 998 (Colo. 1963).
When, though, the president is also the business head of a
corporation, such as general manager or chief operating officer, as
Mr. Ninow' is in this case, contracts of employment or agency are
within the scope of his authority.

The president of a corporation

who is also a general manager having power to superintend and conduct
its business has implied authority to make any contract appropriate
in the ordinary course of its business; and in such cases, his powers
are greater than he would have as president alone.

See Memorial

Hospital Assoc, v. Pacific Grape, 45 Cal.2d 634, 290 P.2d 481 (Cal.
1955) .
More

recently, the court

in GM

Development

Corporation

v.

Community Mortgage Corp., 795 P.2d 827 (Ariz. App. 1990). explained:

. . . . In the instant case, it is undisputed that Shares
[guarantor] selected Beck to be president, chief executive
officer, and chairman of its board of directors. By placing
him in the three most powerful positions within its
corporate management structure, we conclude that Shares
held Beck out as possessing authority to act on its behalf.
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Although the title given an officer of a corporation is not
determinative of his authority, when he is clothed with
titles implying general powers (i.e., president, chief
executive officer and chairman of the board) f the business
public and courts may fairly presume that he is what the
corporation holds him out to be.
GM Development Corp, 795 P.2d at 833.
Mr. Ninow not only was a director but, also, had the right under
the Organization Agreement to appoint a second director, sufficient
to comprise his control of 50% of the board of directors of EnviroPak
(Exl,

13).

He also was designated

as chairman of that board,

president and chief operating executive.

It stretches credulity to

presume Mr. Ninow had no authority to act on behalf of the company or
that Mr. Diston had no legitimate basis to rely upon Mr. Ninow's
express and apparent authority.

The trial court's conclusions on

these issues are amply supported by the facts in evidence and the
pertinent law and authorities.
III. THE TRIAL COURT, HAVING FOUND THAT ENVIROPAK WAS THE ALTER-EGO
OF SURGICAL, ERRED IN TERMINATING THE DAMAGES AS OF THE DATE
ENVIROPAK CEASED BUSINESS.
Mr. Diston has cross-appealed, asserting that the trial court
correctly determined that EnviroPak and Surgical were alter-egos but
erred

in

business.

terminating

damages

as

of

the

date

EnviroPak

ceased

Instead, the trial court should have held Surgical liable

for all of the damages arising out of the breach throughout the
entire term of the Employment Agreement.

The trial court improperly

limited the term of the contract to fourteen months instead of three

years.
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The trial court's two stated reason for limiting damages were
that EnviroPak ceased business on December 31 f 1992 (FF43)

and that

the contracting parties knew there was considerable risk that the
business would fail (FF48).

In so altering the employment contract,

the trial court misapplied the alter ego doctrine.

The court had

already

alter

determined

Surgical.

that

EnviroPak

was

indeed

the

ego

of

Therefore, it was Surgical that legally entered into the

employment contract with Mr. Diston.

Surgical did not go out of

existence on December 31, 1992, but continues in existence today.
Furthermore, even if Surgical had gone out of business with its alter
ego, EnviroPak, on December 31, 1992, it would have still been liable
for breach of the employment contract.2

The trial court's limiting

the damages was, clearly, unjustified.
The alter ego doctrine is well defined by Utah case law.

This

Court has described the alter ego doctrine as follows:
Under the equitable "alter ego" doctrine as it originally
evolved, courts would, on a proper showing, disregard the
integrity of the corporation and view a controlling
shareholder as indistinguishable from the corporation,
thereby permitting creditors of the corporation to reach
the assets of a controlling shareholder. This was done to
prevent the legal separation between the corporation and
the controlling shareholder or shareholders from being used

2

Certainly, Mr. Diston, in such a scenario, would have
been obligated to mitigate his damages by seeking other employment
after the Defendants breached his contract. And in fact, that is
what he did in this case (FF45).
Almost all of Utah's case law, and also that of other
jurisdictions, has been created by appeals challenging the
applicability of the alter ego doctrine. Its effect, on the other
hand, is inherently straight forward, and little case law directly
addresses the effect itself.
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to perpetuate an injustice on third parties. (Citations
omitted).
Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power, 789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah App.
1990) .
The rationale used by courts in permitting the corporate
veil to be pierced is that if
principle shareholder or
owner conducts his private and corporate business on an
interchangeable or joint basis as if they were one, he is
without standing to complain when an injured party does the
same. ... A court of equity looks through form to substance
and has often disregarded the corporate form when it was
fiction in fact and deed and was merely serving the
personal use and convenience of the owner. (Citations
omitted).
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App. 1987).
"Alter ego," according to Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition
(1979), means "second self."

The two entities are treated as one.

This is done, as explained above in Transamerica Cash Reserve and
Colman, by "piercing the corporate veil," i.e., by disregarding the
legal fiction of the separate corporate entity.

Thus when the trial

court found that EnviroPak was the alter ego of Surgical, EnviroPak's
corporate identity was disregarded and Surgical became responsible
and liable for EnviroPak's breach of contract.
recognizable

grounds

for

altering

the

There are no legally

terms

of

Mr.

Diston's

employment contract based upon one company's ceasing business after
it has been determined that the alter ego doctrine is applicable.
The terms establishing the three year duration and the compensation
and benefits thereunder must be applied to Surgical the same as they
would be applied to EnviroPak because the legal fiction of separate
corporate identities no longer exists.
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A similar 1971 Utah Supreme Court case supports this principle.
In Chatterlv v. Omnico, Inc., 485 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971), twelve former
employees of a subsidiary corporation which had ceased
operations

(and which obviously

had no assets)

business

sued the parent

corporation for unpaid wages, severance payf and other benefits. The
trial court found that the alter ego doctrine was applicable and
therefore held the parent corporation liable for the damages.

The

Supreme Court stated:
[The parent corporation] should not be permitted to manage
and operate a business from which it stands to gain
whatever profit may be made, have the advantage of the
efforts of those who serve it, and then use the
nomenclature of another corporation as a facade to insulate
it from the responsibility for paying for those services.
Chatterlv,

485

P. 2d

at

670.

The

Supreme

Court

affirmed

the

applicability of the alter ego doctrine and thereby also affirmed the
judgment for the unpaid wages, severance pay, and other benefits. In
so doing, the Court inherently recognized that the parent was liable
for the obligations of its alter ego even though the alter ego no
longer existed.3
case.

That is where the trial court erred in the instant

The fact that EnviroPak went out of business does not

extinguish its liabilities.

To hold otherwise would allow parent

corporations to circumvent and avoid contractual obligations at will

3

The details concerning the nature of the unpaid
employment obligations are not given in that case. It is probably
safe to assume that the unpaid wages were for hours already worked
and that the twelve employees were under an employment at will
contract. In the instant case, however, Mr. Diston's employment
contract was for a definite and fixed term of three years and the
balance of the term is not extinguished merely by the fact that the
alter ego ceased to exist.
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IV.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO AWARD THE MONTHLY CAR
ALLOWANCE PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT.
Mr. Diston also appeals the trial court's refusal to award car

allowance amounts as part of the damages for the breach of contract.
The trial court's refusal is not based on lack of agreement. Rather,
the court, without the Defendants having raised this issue, based his
determination solely upon Mr. Diston's failure to present to the
Court evidence as to the percentage of time or use of the car in
connection with Mr. Diston's employment required by the agreement
(FF50).

In this conclusionf the trial court erred.

The Courtf based upon the testimony, found that, as part of

the

agreement, Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston agreed that Mr. Diston would
receive a monthly automobile allowance. The Court further found that
Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston orally agreed that that amount would be
$360.00 per month.

Having found the provisions of the agreement

unambiguousf having held the agreement itself enforceable, and having
found a breach of the agreement by the Defendants, the trial court
improperly

read

into

the

contract

conditions

precedent

to

Mr.

Diston's entitlement to the car allowance, which were not part of the
agreement.
No evidence was before the court suggesting that any conditions
precedent

were

contracted

or

even

contemplated.

Rather,

the

undisputed evidence was that the car allowance was for a fixed amount
for

a

fixed

period.

Mr. Diston was

to

receive

an

automobile

allowance as part of his compensation, but since he had recently
purchased an automobile, the amount of the car allowance was set to
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approximate his existing car payment (R603) .
undisputed

testimony

alone, Mr. Diston

Based

upon

the

is entitled to have the

$360.00 per month car allowance added as part of the damages for
breach of contract.
The

trial

court

overlooked

the

fact

that

negotiation

of

employment compensation typically involves the payment of more than
simply wages, i.e..

health insurance, disability insurance, life

insurance, automobile arrangementsf

"golden parachute" provisions,

retirement arrangements and expense accounts.
common form of compensation

Fringe benefits are a

for employees and, unless

provided

in the tax lawsf

employee

(§61(a)(l) Internal Revenue Code of

deductible

to

the

employer

are included

as

ordinary

as gross

and

expenses (§162 Internal Revenue Code of 1986).

otherwise

income to the

1986) and normally
necessary

business

Included in common

examples of fringe benefits are an employer-provided automobile (IRS
Regs. §1.61-21(a)(1)).

The obligation would be Mr. Diston's to

justify any tax return deduction he may claim on his tax return (IRS
Regs. § 1.162-1).
It is no more logical or just for the trial court to require
extraneous evidence of Mr. Diston's anticipated mileage use than it
would be for the court to read into an employment contract: amount of
illness anticipated to be caused by work to justify health insurance,
anticipated

future work-caused

disability

to

justify

disability

insurance, absolute number of hours to be worked to justify a salary
versus an hourly payment for an employee, or amount of hours spent to
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justify an annual two-week vacation.

For this reason, the trial

court's denial of this benefit should be reversed, and Mr. Diston
should be awarded the $360.00 car allowance for each month during the
contract period.
CONCLUSION
The trial court found, supported by an abundance of evidence,
the existence of an employment agreement between EnviroPak and Mr.
Diston which contained all of the essential elements of an agreement
and which was an enforceable agreement.

The trial court further

found that Mr. Ninow was, by the Defendants' agreements, clothed with
the authority to enter into that agreement and to bind EnviroPak in
that

matter.

The

trial

court

further

appropriately

found

the

existence of an alter-ego arrangement between Surgical and EnviroPak.
The Defendants have not marshalled the evidence to challenge the
legitimacy and reasonableness of the trial court's findings and,
accordingly, the findings must be affirmed on appeal.

The court's

conclusions of law and judgment should also be affirmed.
The trial court, however, erred in terminating Mr. Diston's
damages as of the date that EnviroPak ceased doing business, even
though Surgical continued in business.

Mr. Diston should be awarded

damages for the entire thirty-six period of the breached contract
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andf further, should have included within those damages the amount of
the agreed-upon car allowance of $360.00 per month,
DATED this

^ 7

day of May, 1994

Neil R. Sabin
Marilynn P. Fineshriber
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 532-1900
Attorneys
for
Plaintiff/Appellee
John Diston

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed, postage prepaid this <f_J_

/r

day of May, 1994 to the offices of the following counsel of record:
Ellen Maycock
David C. Wright
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
800 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM

Tab A

NOV 1 6

Neil R. Sabin (2840)
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-1900

TO

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN DISTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
SURGICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
formerly PINNACLE
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., a
Delaware corporation,

i
i
]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]
;
]
]
]
]

Civil No. 920902269CN
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

This matter came on regularly for trial on July 19 and July
20, 1993, before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable David
Roth, Judge, presiding and hearing all evidence.

Plaintiff

appeared in person by and through his attorney, Neil R. Sabin.
The Defendants appeared through their representatives and their
attorney, Ellen Maycock.

The Court, having reviewed the

pleadings and documents on file herein, having heard testimony
and observed and considered the respective credibility and the
testimony of the witnesses, having heard arguments and reviewed

n ;• r

\

r
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memoranda and documentation submitted by the parties, and being
fully advised in the premises now makes and enters its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff, John Diston ("Mr. Diston") is an individual

and resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc.

("EnviroPak"), was incorporated as a Utah corporation and at all
times relevant herein had its principal place of business in Salt
Lake County, Utah.
3.

Defendant Surgical Technologies, Inc. ("Surgical"),

is

a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business in
Salt Lake County, Utah.
Environmental, Inc.

Surgical was formerly known as Pinnacle

The name of that corporation was changed to

its current name April 15, 1992.

At all relevant times, Pinnacle

was qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Utah.
4.

Surgical is a public company, having various

subsidiaries.
5.

Mr. Diston was employed at Holy Cross Hospital in Salt

Lake City, Utah, from 1977 until October 31, 1991.

As of the

termination of this employment, his title was Assistant Director
of Peri-Operative Services.
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6.

During late 1990 and early 1991, Frederick P. Ninow

("Mr. Ninow") was associated with a company called Professional
Medical.
7.

While associated with Professional Medical, Mr. Ninow

undertook planning and efforts anticipating Professional
Medical's possible manufacture and marketing of pre-packaged
supply packets featuring principal components that are laundered,
sterilized and pre-packed for repeated use in surgical and other
health care procedures (the "Product").
8.

Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston became acquainted while Mr.

Ninow was investigating the anticipated Product and the nature of
a possible market for that Product.
9.

When Professional Medical was unwilling or unable to

attempt to market the Product on a large scale, Mr. Ninow decided
to leave Professional Medical, to form his own company and to
raise money for marketing the Product.
10.

During this time, Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston began

discussing their respective roles with that new company, with the
understanding that Mr. Diston was to be a member of that new
company and to serve as Director/Operations.

Preliminary

discussions were also made with other persons for future
involvement with the new company.
11.

During that time, Mr. Ninow, with some input from Mr.

Diston and others, wrote a rough and general business plan
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regarding the proposed company financing, operation and marketing
of the Product.
12.

Mr. Ninow was acquainted with a son of Rex Crosland,

chairman of Surgical.

As a result of discussions between those

persons, Mr. Ninow became introduced to principals of Surgical,
including Rex Crosland, Todd Crosland and Rockwell Schutjer in
the Summer of 1991, several months after his association began
with Mr. Diston.
13.

Pursuant to the discussions between Mr. Ninow and the

Surgical representatives, those parties agreed to establish
EnviroPak, as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Surgical, for
marketing of the Product.
14.

Surgical caused Surgical's counsel to prepare the

Articles of Incorporation for EnviroPak, an Organization
Agreement among Surgical, EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow, and an
Employment Agreement between EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow.
15.

Mr. Ninow, EnviroPak and Surgical, as the sole

shareholder of EnviroPak, executed the Organization Agreement,
dated September 19, 1991.
16.

The Organization Agreement provided, among other

things, that: EnviroPak was a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Surgical; that Mr. Ninow would be director, chairman of the board
and president of EnviroPak; that EnviroPak would enter into an
Executive Employment Agreement with Mr. Ninow contemporaneously
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with the execution of the Organization Agreement; that Mr. Ninow
assigned to EnviroPak his business plan; that Surgical could
designate two directors of EnviroPak; that Mr, Ninow could also
choose another director of EnviroPak; and that EnviroPak would
have considerable autonomy of operation.
17.

Todd Crosland and Rockwell Schutjer served as directors

of EnviroPak as designated by Surgical.
18.

The Organization Agreement was silent on the issue of

whether Mr. Ninow had the authority to hire employees for
EnviroPak and to make a commitment for any particular salary.
19.

The parties executed an Executive Employment Agreement,

between EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow, also prepared by EnviroPak*s
counsel.
20.

This was subsequently executed.
The Executive Employment Agreement provided that Mr.

Ninow was employed by EnviroPak as president, as director, as
chairman of the board of directors, and as chief operating
officer "with all of the rights, powers and obligations normally
associated with such position."
21.

On September 19, 1991, the same date as the

Organization Agreement, Surgical prepared and caused release of a
news release regarding the formation of EnviroPak and, in that
release, referred to Mr. Ninow as "EnviroPak President and CEO."
22.

Throughout his discussions with Surgical, Mr. Ninow

advised Mr. Diston as to the nature of Mr. Ninow1s discussions
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with Surgical, since both individuals expected Mr. Diston to be
part of the company marketing the Product.
23.

There was no evidence that Rockwell Schutjer or Todd

Crosland knew Mr. Ninow had offered employment to Mr. Diston
until after execution of the letter of intent between EnviroPak
and Mr. Diston.
24.

Because of Mr. Ninow1s specific responsibilities with

EnviroPak, pursuant to the Organization Agreement and the
Executive Employment Agreement, Mr. Ninow believed that he had
the authority to enter into an employment arrangement with Mr.
Diston.
25.

Mr. Ninow delivered the letter of intent to Mr. Diston

and, also, delivered a letter of intent to Rochelle Mills-LaRocco
on or about September 20, 1991.
26.

Pursuant to Mr. Diston's and Mr. Ninow's discussions,

on September 20, 1991, Mr. Ninow, signing as the "duly authorized
officer" of EnviroPak, executed a Letter of Intent to Enter
Employment Agreement (the "Employment Agreement") with Mr. Diston
as the employee.
27.

The Employment Agreement provided that Mr. Diston would

be employed for three years commencing on or before October 31,
1991; would receive a salary of $72,000 per year, payable biweekly; would receive a monthly automobile allowance; would
participate in the company's stock option program; would receive
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health and accident insurance; would be reimbursed for business
expenses; would participate in the incentive compensation
program; and would receive two weeks paid vacation.
28.

Mr. Diston and Mr. Ninow both contemplated that Mr.

Diston would enter into a formal, complete employment agreement,
consistent with the Letter of Intent, at a later time.
29.

After preparation of the Employment Agreement, Mr.

Ninow and Mr. Diston orally agreed to a $360.00 per month
automobile allowance for Mr. Diston.
30.

Mr. Diston informed Mr. Ninow that he accepted that

agreement and that he intended to give notice to terminate his
employment at Holy Cross Hospital.
31.

On or about October 9, 1991, Mr. Diston, in reliance on

the Employment Agreement, notified Holy Cross Hospital of his
intent to terminate his employment effective October 31, 1991.
32.

Both Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston considered the Employment

Agreement fully binding upon Mr. Diston and EnviroPak.
33.

Because of the acts of EnviroPak and Pinnacle in

drafting the Organization Agreement, Employment Agreement and
issuing the press release, Mr. Ninow believed he had the
authority to execute the Letter of Intent.

Under the

circumstances of this case, it was reasonable for Mr. Diston to
rely on Mr. Ninow's authority.
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34.

Mr. Distort1

s reliance on the Letter of Intent and

giving notice to Holy Cross Hospital of his termination were
reasonable under the circumstances.
35.

After giving notice of termination to Holy Cross

Hospital, Mr. Diston became aware of problems between Mr. Ninow
and Surgical.

Mr. Diston was, for the first time, informed of

problems affecting the job.
36.

Mr. Diston asked Holy Cross Hospital whether he could

receive his job back.

He was told, however, that Holy Cross

Hospital had made arrangements and commitments with other
personnel and, accordingly, it was not possible to get the job
back.
37.

Surgical, as the sole shareholder of EnviroPak failed

to observe the separate corporation structure format and
operation of EnviroPak which included at least the following:
a.

Under paragraph 3 of the Employment Agreement, Mr.

Ninow served at the pleasure of the board of either Surgical
or EnviroPak, suggesting that Surgical retained significant
control over EnviroPak.
b.

Surgical was the sole entity and source of the

funding of the business and anticipated business of
EnviroPak.
c.

EnviroPak was capitalized with only $1,000

capital, which was grossly undercapitalized for the
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anticipated business of this type and illusory or trifling
compared with the business to be done and the risk of loss.
d.

The corporate formalities were not observed

between Surgical and EnviroPak.

The failure to maintain the

corporate formalities and separateness reasonably and likely
created the potential of inequitable results leaving
EnviroPak totally dependent upon Surgical.
38.

Disputes arose between persons who were representatives

of Surgical and EnviroPak and Mr. Ninow.

Pursuant to these

disputes, Mr. Ninow, before December 10, 1991, was terminated
for, among other things, failing to consult with the board of
directors of EnviroPak on important decisions, including whether
to hire employees.
39.

Given the nature of the disputes and the actions of Mr.

Ninow, it is not unreasonable to determine that Mr. Ninow should
have been fired in this case.
40.

Mr. Diston subsequently met with Todd B. Crosland and

Rockwell P. Schutjer.

During discussions, these Surgical and

EnviroPak representatives offered Mr. Diston employment with
EnviroPak for $60,000, but without the other benefits which Mr.
Diston believed he was entitled to under the Employment
Agreement.

Moreover, they refused to provide any specificity of

the job or any written agreement.
41.
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42.

Mr. Diston, having measured the risks of a three year

contract which was not honored, together with the risks of a
contract offered by Pinnacle without a time period and as an
employee at will contract, was reasonable in rejecting the offer.
43.

EnviroPak ceased business operations effective December

31, 1992.
44.

Insufficient evidence exists for the court to determine

that Pinnacle purposely, or negligently, was responsible for the
failure of the business of EnviroPak.
45.

Mr. Diston was unemployed from October 31, 1991, until

February 24, 1992, at which time he became employed with FHP
Health Care where he continues to be employed.
46.

From February 24, 1992, until December 31 1992, Mr.

Diston earned $29,165.40 as gross income.
47.

The difference between what Mr. Diston earned from

October 31, 1991, through December 31, 1992, and what Mr. Diston
was to be paid under the Employment Agreement was $54,834.60.
48.

Mr. Diston reasonably could not be expected to be

entitled to damages beyond the date of December 31, 1992, because
the business ceased to exist and the parties understood at the
time of entry of their agreement that it was a risky undertaking.
49.

Insufficient evidence exists with respect to the terms

and calculations of any damages for failure of stock options and
for incentive bonuses.
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50.

With respect to the monthly car allowance, no evidence

is before the Court as to what percentage of time or use the Mr.
Diston was required to use the car in connection with his
Employment with EnviroPak.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Mr. Ninow had the apparent authority to enter into the

Employment Agreement with Mr. Diston.
2.

Mr. Diston reasonably relied upon Mr. Ninow's apparent

authority to enter into the Employment Agreement.
3.

Mr. Ninow and Mr. Diston agreed on the essential

provisions of the Letter of Intent to the extent that it provided
for an offer of employment of a term of years and for a specific
salary and, hence, there existed a valid agreement between
EnviroPak and Mr. Diston.
4.

Because of the understandings and agreements contained

in the Letter of Intent, and the reliance of Mr. Diston on the
contract, the statute of frauds does not apply; and the
Employment Agreement constitutes an enforceable agreement.
5.

Mr. Diston was ready and willing to perform under the

Employment Agreement and was not in breach thereof.
6.

EnviroPak breached the Employment Agreement with Mr.

Diston and refused to perform thereunder.
7.

Because there existed such a unity of interest between

Surgical and EnviroPak and the failure to observe separate

24730. DI783.1

-11-

L

%

J vJ v. O

corporate form, such arrangements sanctioned the possibility of
fraud or otherwise promoted injustice; EnviroPak was a hollow
shell and not a viable entity; and EnviroPak was an alter ego of
Surgical.
8.

As a result, the breach of contract by EnviroPak also

constituted a breach of contract by Surgical.
9.

There does not exist sufficient evidence for a claim of

tortious interference of economic benefits against Surgical.
10.

Mr. Diston is entitled to damages for breach of

contract in the amount of $54,834.60, representing the difference
that Plaintiff earned from October 31, 1991, through December 31,
1992,

and the amounts that he would have been entitled to earn

under the contract with EnviroPak, together with interest at the
pre-judgment rate for each deficient amount of compensation
payment from that date the payment was due.
11.

Plaintiff is not entitled to any payments since

December 31, 1992, because EnviroPak's business was terminated
12.

Because of insufficient evidence, Plaintiff is not

entitled to any judgment arising from stock options, incentive
bonuses or car allowance.
DATED this

J^^

9

<J> day of^S^fember, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

; >David

Roth
DISTRICT COURT JUDGBV
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

2$

day of September, 1993,

I served upon the following a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, by causing the
same to be mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
50 West 300 South, Suite 800
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
8^cPl
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FILED DISTRICT G0URT
Third Judicial District

Neil R. Sabin (2840)
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-1900

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN DISTON,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

S>l<S>~?l-f53

v.
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
SURGICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
formerly PINNACLE
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., a
Delaware corporation,

Civil No. 920902269CN
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

This matter came on regularly for trial on July 19 and July
20, 1993, before the Honorable David Roth, Judge presiding, and
the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendants,
jointly and severally, for:
1.

The sum of $54,834.60; plus

2.

$7,329.48, representing pre-judgment interest from the

date each payment was respectively due to September 1, 1993,
with pre-judgment interest at $15.24 per day until entry of
the Judgment herein; plus
3.

Interest from and after date of judgment at the legal
^^y<^

rate until paid.
DATED this

S
1993.

day of
BY THE COURT:

C^rfSTRICT COUKT JUDGE p
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 3%

day of

"S^^^^y^-^ ,

1993, I served upon the following a true and correct copy of the
foregoing JUDGMENT, by causing the same to be mailed, postage
pre-paid, to the following:
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
50 West 300 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utc
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LETTER OF INTENT
TO ENTER EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
THIS LETTER OF INTENT TO ENTER INTO AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
(this "Letter of intent") dated September 20, 1991, by and between
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS INC., a corporation organized and
existing under the state of Utah (the "Company") and JOHN DISTON
("Employee").
1.
INTENT. The Company intends to enter into an employment
agreement with Employee on or before October 31, 1991.
2.
Term. The initial term of the employment agreement shall
be for three years.
3.

Compensation.

(a)
For all services rendered by Employee, the Company
shall pay a salary of $72,000 per year payable as earned in
twenty-four (24) equal semi-monthly payments.
All salary
shall be subject to withholdings and other applicable taxes.
Such salary shall be reviewed annually and shall remain fixed
or be increased to the extent deemed appropriate by the board
of directors of the Company.
(b) As an incentive
compensation,
Employee
shall
participate in the Company,s cash incentive compensation pool.
(c) The Company
shall provide health and medical
insurance to be chosen by the Company for its full time
employees.
(d) The Company
automobile allowance.

shall

provide

Employee

a

monthly

(e)
The Company shall provide Employee with stock
options as incentive to enter into an Employment Agreement
with the Company. The Company shall also provide Employee with
future stock options as part of the Company incentive program.
These options will be determined by the company at the time of
employment.
(f) The Company will pay for actual and reasonable
expenses incurred by Employee in connection with the business
of the company, including expenses for entertainment, travel
and similar items.
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(g) The Employee shall be entitled each year to a paid
vacation of at least two (2) weeks.

LETTER OF INTENT as of the date first above written.

ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC,

Duly/)Autfi6rized Officer
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ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT
THIS ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is entered into this 19th day of
September, 1991, by and between FREDERICK NINOW, an individual CNinow"), ENVIRO PAK
MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC. (the "Company"), a Utah corporation, and P I N N A C L E
ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., a Delaware corporation, and sole shareholder of the Company ("Pinnacle")
on the following:

Premises
Ninow has developed a business plan to package, market, and service prepackaged medical
supplies for various health care procedures and desires to participate in the organization of a business
enterprise to implement such business plan. The Company has or can obtain financial, managerial,
and other resources that it can provide to such enterprise. Pinnacle, as the sole shareholders of the
Company desires to provide certain incentives to Ninow and other persons associated with the
Company. Therefore, the parties desire to join together in organizing a business and operation to
implement the business plan developed by Ninow.

Agreement
NOW, THEREFORE, upon these premises which are incorporated herein by reference, and for
and in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants set forth herein, it is hereby agreed as
follows:
1.
Organization of Company. Immediately preceding the execution of this Agreement, the
Company has been organized as a Utah corporation with articles of incorporation in the form attached
hereto as exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference. As set forth in such articles of incorporation,
the sole incorporator and initial director of the Company is Todd B. Crosland. The Company will elect
the following persons as officers and directors:
Frederick Ninow
Rockwell D. Schutjer
Todd B. Crosland

Director, Chairman, and President
Director and Vice-President
Director and Secretary/Treasurer

2.
Assignment of Business Plan. Ninow hereby assigns, conveys, and sets over unto the
Company all of Ninow's right, title, and interest in and to a business plan, procedure, method of
practice, and related know-how, information, business contacts, relationships, and other information
relating to the initiation and operation of a business enterprise to market to hospitals and other health
care providers prepackaged supply packets containing materials frequently used in surgical and other
health care procedures, featuring principal components that are laundered, sterilized, and repackaged
for repeated use, rather than disposed of, all as more particularly described in the materials attached
hereto as exhibit B and incorporated herein by reference (the "Business Plan").
3.
Autonomous Operation. During the term hereof, the Company shall have its own
management, budget, physical facilities, and accounting books and records so as to retain its separate
identity from Pinnacle and its other subsidiaries. During such period, Pinnacle shall cause the board
of directors of the Company to consist of four persons, one of whom shall be Ninow, one of whom shall
be a person designated by Ninow, and two of them shall be designees of Pinnacle.
4.
Financial Support. The Company shall utilize its best efforts to obtain such capital,
credit enhancement, and other financing as it may reasonably require to acquire, open, and place in
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operation individual repackaging centers serving appropriate market territories to provide the
services generally described in the Business Plan at the cost for capital expenditures, startup
expenses, and related expenditures as more particular described therein, subject to the achievement of
financial performance for centers previously placed in operation generally consist with the results of
operations forecast in such Business Plan.
5.
Employment Agreement. Contemporaneously with the execution of this Agreement, the
Company shall enter into an executive employment agreement with Ninow.
6.
Stock Options for Other Key Employees. As the Company assembles its management
team of key executives during the next year, Pinnacle shall grant and issue to such key executives as
the Company may determine,when they become associated with the Company, options to purchase an
aggregate of 100,000 shares of common stock of the Company under and subject to the terms and
conditions of Pinnacle's 1989 Stock Option and Stock Award Plan.
7.
Incentive Compensation. The Company shall create a cash incentive compensation pool
based on the Company's pre-tax profits as a percentage of revenues, to be divided among the various
members of the executive management group of the Company, in such manner as the board of
directors of the Company may determine. The amount to be allocated to such incentive compensation
pool and to be allocated among and paid to such executives shall be determined as follows:
Percent of Pre-Tax

Pre-Tax Profits as a
Percentage of Gross Revenues
15%, but less than 20%
20%, but less than 25%
25%, but less than 30%
30%, but less than 35%
35% or more

Profits Allocated
to Compensation Pool
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%

Revenues shall include all revenues from the sale of products or services by the Company, net of
returns and adjustments, and including extraordinary items. Pre-tax profits shall include all profits
from whatever source, including extraordinary items, prior to payment of or allowance for income
taxes. Such incentive compensation shall be determined and paid annually, in any event within
110 days after the end of the fiscal year. To the extent practicable, prior to the end of the fiscal year
the Company shall review its estimated earnings and profits for the year, shall estimate the amount
allocable to such incentive compensation pool, shall allocate such pool among the various members of
the executive management team, and shall pay such estimated amounts, with final adjustments and
reconciliations to be made within 110 days after the end of such year. By way of example, if in a given
fiscal year the Company had gross revenues of $10,000,000 that result in pre-tax profits of $2,300,000,
which is 23% of such revenues, then 2% of such $2,300,000 of pre-tax profits, or $46,000, would be
allocated to such incentive compensation pool.
8.
Standard Textiles Products. The parties shall cooperate and utilize their best efforts to
obtain from Standard Textiles such reasonable assurances as Pinnacle and the Company may deem
adequate respecting the recognition of the conveyance by Ninow to the Company of the Business Plan
described herein, the initiation of such business by the Company, and the grant to the Company of an
exclusive marketing territory for selected markets for certain products.
9.

Indemnification

(a)
Pinnacle hereby agrees to indemnify the Company, its executive officers and
directors, against any and all Pinnacle liabilities, obligations, claims for relief, and other losses
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or damages that the Company or its executive officers or directors may suffer or incur as a result
of any action or failure to act by Pinnacle.
(b)
The Company hereby agrees to indemnify Pinnacle, its executive officers and
directors, against any and all Company liabilities, obligations, claims for relief, and other losses
or damages that Pinnacle or its executive officers or directors may suffer or incur as a result of
any action or failure to act by the Company.
10.

Term. This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect through September 30, 1996.

11.
Notice of Default. No party shall exercise any right or remedy on the alleged default of
the other party unless such party shall have failed to remedy such alleged default within 30 days after
notice thereof from the nondefaulting party.
12.
Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with
the laws of the state of Utah.
13.
Notices. All notices, demands, requests, or other communications required or authorized
hereunder shall be deemed given sufficiently if in writing and if personally delivered; if sent by
facsimile transmission, confirmed with a written copy thereof sent by overnight express delivery; if
sent by registered mail or certified mail, return receipt requested and postage prepaid; or if sent by
overnight express delivery:
If to the Company, to:

EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc.
Attn: Todd B. Crosland
774 South 500 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Facsimile No.: (801) 359-7755

If to Ninow, to:

Mr. Frederick Ninow
7490 South Bekkemellom Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

or such other addresses and facsimile numbers as shall be furnished in writing by any party in the
manner for giving notices hereunder, and any such notice, demand, request, or other communication
shall be deemed to have been given as of the date so delivered or sent by facsimile transmission, three
days after the date so mailed, or one day after the date so sent by overnight delivery.
14.
Attorneys1 Fees. In the event that any party institutes any action or suit to enforce this
Agreement or to secure relief from any default hereunder or breach hereof, the breaching party or
parties shall reimburse the nonbreaching party or parties for all costs, including reasonable attorneys'
fees, incurred in connection therewith and in enforcing or collecting any judgment rendered therein.
15.
Specific Performance. The parties acknowledge that the rights in this Agreement are
extraordinary and unique, ^nd that remedies at law may be inadequate to compensate the parties for
the breach or threatened breach of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. The parties consent to
the granting of equitable relief, including specific performance or injunction, whether temporary,
preliminary, or final, in favor of the other party without proof of actual damages.
16.
Survival; Termination. The representations, warranties, and covenants of the respective
parties shall survive the closing date and the consummation of the transactions herein contemplated.
17.
Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which
shall be deemed an original and all of which taken together shall be but a single instrument.
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18.
No Assignment This Agreement cannot be assigned in whole or in part by one of the
parties without the prior written consent of all other parties.
DATE D as of the year and date first above written.

Frederick Ninow
ENV1RO PAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC.

d B. Crosland, President
PINNACLE ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.

RexCrdsland, President
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EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
THIS EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is entered into
effective October 1, 1991, by and between ENVIRO PAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC., a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the state of Utah (the "Company"), and FREDERICK
NINOW ("Executive").
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual covenants contained herein and of the mutual
benefits to the parties to be derived therefrom, the parties agree as follows:
1.
Employment. The Company hereby employs Executive to perform those duties generally
described in this Agreement, and Executive hereby accepts and agrees to such employment on the
terms and conditions set forth.
2.
Term. The initial term of this Agreement shall be for a period of five years commencing
on the date of this Agreement, unless earlier terminated in the manner provided herein. If not
terminated in writing by the Company or Executive, this Agreement shall continue in effect on a
month-to-month basis subsequent to expiration of the initial term. Executive understands and
acknowledges that this Agreement may be terminated by the Company during the initial term in
accordance with the express provisions of this Agreement and may be terminated at any time
subsequent to the initial term, by either the Company or the Executive on 15 days' written notice to
the other.
3.
Duties. During the term of this Agreement, Executive shall be employed by the
Company, subject to change by the board of directors, as the chief operating executive of the Company
and shall have all of the rights, powers, and obligations normally associated with such position.
Executive agrees to serve, at the pleasure of the board of directors of the Company or any parent of the
Company, as president, director, and chairman of the board of directors of the Company and in such
additional and/or other offices or positions with the Company or any parent or subsidiary of the
Company as shall, from time to time, be determined by such board of directors, without compensation
other than as set forth herein. Executive shall devote his full working time, attention, and energy to
the business of the Company or its parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates and shall not during the term of
this Agreement be engaged in any other business activities which will significantly interfere or
conflict with the reasonable performance of his duties hereunder.
4.
Best Efforts. Executive agrees that he will faithfully, industriously, and to the best of his
ability, experience, and talents, perform his duties under the terms of this Agreement and will seek to
promote and develop the business of the Company.
5.

Compensation

(a)
For all services rendered by Executive, the Company shall pay to Executive a
salary of $100,000 per year, payable as earned in 24 equal semi-monthly payments. All salary
payments shall be subject to withholding and other applicable taxes. Such salary shall be
reviewed annually and shall remain fixed or be increased to the extent deemed appropriate by
the board of directors of the Company.
(b)
As incentive compensation, Executive shall participate in the Company's cash
incentive compensation pool from which the Company allocates and pays to its key executives
cash incentive compensation based on the Company's pretax profits as a percentage of revenues,
as follows:
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Percent of Pre-Tax
Profits Allocated
to Compensation Pool

Pre-Tax Profits as a
Percentage of Gross Revenues
15%, but less than 20%
20%, but less than 25%
25%, but less than 30%
30%, but less than 35%
35% or more

1%
2%
3%
4%
5%

Revenues shall include all revenues from the sale of products or services by the Company, net of
returns and adjustments, and including extraordinary items. Pre-tax profits shall include all profits
from whatever source, including extraordinary items, prior to payment of or allowance for income
taxes. Such incentive compensation shall be determined and paid annually, in any event within
110 days after the end of the fiscal year. To the extent practicable, prior to the end of the fiscal year
the Company shall review its estimated earnings and profits for the year, shall estimate the amount
allocable to such incentive compensation pool, shall allocate such pool among the various members of
the executive management team, and shall pay such estimated amounts, with final adjustments and
reconciliations to be made within 110 days after the end of such year. By way of example, if in a given
fiscal year the Company had gross revenues of $10,000,000 that result in pre-tax profits of $2,300,000,
which is 23% of such revenues, then 2% of such $2,300,000 of pre-tax profits, or $46,000, would be
allocated to such incentive compensation pool.
6.
Working Facilities. The Company shall provide Executive with such reasonable working
facilities and services, including an office and secretarial assistance, as are necessary and appropriate
for the performance of his duties. Such facilities and services shall be provided to Executive at the
Company's principal place of business or such other place as may be reasonably determined by the
board of directors of the Company.
7.
Employment Benefits. The Company shall provide health and medical insurance for
Executive in a form and program to be chosen by the Company for its full-time employees. Executive
shall be entitled to participate in any retirement, pension, profit-sharing, stock option, or other plan as
now in effect or hereafter adopted by the Company on the same basis as other employees.
8.
Vacations. Executive shall be entitled each year to a paid vacation of at least three
weeks. Vacation shall be taken by Executive at a time and with starting and ending dates mutually
convenient to the Company and Executive. Vacation or portions of vacations not used in one
employment year shall carry over to the next succeeding employment year, but shall thereafter expire
if not used within such succeeding year.
9.
Expenses. The Company will reimburse Executive for actual and reasonable expenses
incurred by Executive in connection with the business of the Company, including expenses for
entertainment, travel, attendance at conventions, employee training, and similar items, on
Executive^ periodic presentation of an itemized account of such expenses, together with supporting
documentation.
10.
Ownership of Discoveries. Executive agrees to fully and completely disclose any and all
present and future inventions, improvements, discoveries, techniques, or products (the "Discoveries")
related to the business or proposed business of the Company resulting from Executive's activities
during the term of this Agreement, whether such activities are performed on or off the premises of the
Company. All such Discoveries shall be the sole and exclusive property of the Company. Executive
agrees to provide all information and data concerning such Discoveries in his possession or control to
the Company and to lend reasonable assistance to the Company concerning the use and application of
such Discoveries and shall execute and deliver all such documents and take all such other actions as
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are reasonably necessary to vest all right, title, and interest in such Discoveries, including patents,
copyrights, and trademarks with respect thereto, in the Company.
11.
Covenant Not to Compete During Term of Agreement. During the initial term of this
Agreement and any extension subsequent to the expiration of the initial term, Executive agrees not to
engage, directly or indirectly, in any business or activity, whether as an employee, equity proprietor,
or partner, of any corporation or association that competes in any geographic market with the
Company or its parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it shall not be a
breach of the provisions of this paragraph for Executive to purchase equity securities in the ordinary
course of his investments if Executive's sole affiliation with such business or association is the
ownership of 5% or less of the equity of any such business or association.
12.
Covenant Not to Compete Subsequent to Term of Agreement. Executive acknowledges
that he will acquire and develop certain methods, skills, and expertise in the operation and conduct of
the business of the Company during the course of his employment with the Company. Executive
agrees that for a period of one year subsequent to the expiration or earlier termination of the initial
term of this Agreement or any extension of that initial term, he will not, directly or indirectly, provide
services similar to those services to any business, corporation, or other entity that:
(a)
Provides services or products similar to or competitive with the services or
products provided by the Company to past, present, or prospective customers of the Company;
(b)
Competes with the services or products provided by the Company in any
geographic market; or
(c)
Is undertaking entry into a geographic market that is similar to or competitive
with the markets of the Company.
The covenants contained in this paragraph shall be construed as a series of separate covenants, one for
each state in the United States of America and one for each country outside the United States of
America. Except for geographical coverage, each separate covenant shall be deemed identical in its
terms. If in any judicial proceeding, a court shall refuse to enforce any of the separate covenants
deemed included in this paragraph, the unenforceable covenant shall be deemed eliminated from this
paragraph for the purpose of that proceeding and to the extent necessary to permit the remaining
separate covenants (meaning the covenants with respect to the remaining geographical areas) to be
enforced.
The provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed as restricting Executive's right to own shares
or other equity interests in any corporation or association provided that Executive does not perform
services for, or participate in any way in the management of such entity in violation of the provisions
of this paragraph and that Executive owns 5% or less of the equity of any such business or association.
The provisions of this paragraph shall survive the termination of this Agreement.
13.
Nondisclosure'of Information. Executive acknowledges that he will have access to
confidential data and information which is of a special and unique value to the Company, including,
without limitation, the books and records of the Company relating to operations, finances, accounting,
sales, personnel, and management; technical information related to proprietary rights of the
Company; information with respect to customer names, addresses, and requirements; price lists; costs
of operations, services, and products of the Company; and methods of doing business. Executive agrees
to keep himself fully informed of the policies and procedures established by the Company for
safeguarding its property and will strictly comply with those policies and procedures at all times.
Executive agrees he will not, during or after the term of this Agreement, divulge or appropriate to his
own use or the use of others, or maliciously divulge to any other person, any trade secret, proprietary
item, or any item designated "Confidential" by the Company, its parents, or subsidiaries. For
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purposes of this Agreement, the term "trade secret" shall mean any information, process, or procedure
utilized by the Company, its parents, and subsidiaries which is not public information and which is
maintained on a confidential basis by the Company, specifically including its methods of pricing,
biding processes and procedures, supplier lists, supplier agreements, and training procedures. The
term "proprietary item" shall mean any item of information or data and any processes or procedures
owned by the Company, its parents, and subsidiaries specifically including its customer lists, methods
of operation, and special procedures utilized in its operations. Executive agrees that he will not,
except as authorized by the Company, remove any property belonging to the Company from its place of
business. Executive hereby covenants and agrees to return all documents, information, and data to
the Company immediately upon termination of this Agreement. The provisions of this paragraph
shall survive the termination of this Agreement.
14.
Remedies on Default. If, at any time, Executive breaches, to any material extent, the
provisions of paragraphs 10, 11, 12, or 13 hereof, the Company shall have the right to terminate all of
its obligations to make further payments under the terms of this Agreement. Executive hereby
specifically acknowledges that monetary damages to the Company for the breach of certain provisions
hereunder, specifically including the ownership of Discoveries as set forth in paragraph 10, the
covenants not to compete set forth in paragraphs 11 and 12, and the nondisclosure of information set
forth in paragraph 13, may be difficult to determine and/or inadequate to compensate the Company for
a breach thereof, and hereby agrees that in the event of any breach by Executive of such provisions,
the Company, in addition to any other remedies it may have under the terms of this Agreement or at
law, shall have the right to bring an action in equity for an injunction against the breach or threatened
breach of such obligations or seeking specific performance of the obligations of Executive thereunder.
If the provisions of this paragraph shall survive the termination of this Agreement.
15.
Disability. If Executive is unable to perform his services by reason of illness or
incapacity for a period of more than 12 consecutive weeks, the compensation thereafter payable to him
by the Company during the continued period of such illness or incapacity shall be reduced by 50%.
Executive's full compensation shall be reinstated on his return to full employment and discharge of his
full duties. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, the Company may terminate this Agreement
at any time after Executive shall be absent from his employment, for whatever cause, for a continuous
period of more than six months or for an aggregate of nine months in any 24-month period, and all
obligations of the Company under the terms of this Agreement shall thereon terminate.
16.
Termination by the Company. In addition to its rights to terminate this Agreement set
forth elsewhere herein and notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, this Agreement
and the Executive's employment may be terminated by the Company on the occurrence of any of the
following:
(a)
Executive's conduct involving the business affairs of the Company constituting
common law fraud, conviction of a felony, embezzlement from the Company, or other willful or
malicious unlawful conduct of a similar nature;
(b)

Any material breach by Executive of the provisions of this Agreement; or

(c)
Executive has been grossly negligent in the performance of his duties, has
substantially failed to meet reasonable standards established by the Company for the
performance of his duties, or has engaged in any material willful misconduct in the performance
of his duties hereunder.
If this Agreement is terminated by the Company in accordance with the provisions of this
paragraph 16 or as provided elsewhere in this Agreement, the Company shall have no further
obligation to make further salary payments to Executive under the terms of this Agreement.
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17.
Death During Employment. If Executive dies during the term of this Agreement, the
Company shall pay to the estate of Executive the compensation that would otherwise be payable to
Executive up to the end of the month in which his death occurs.
18.
Nontransferability. Neither Executive, his spouse, his designated contingent
beneficiary, nor their estates shall have any right to anticipate, encumber, or dispose of any payment
due under this Agreement. Such payments and other rights are expressly declared nonassignable and
nontransferable except as specifically provided herein.
19.
Indemnification. Except for willful misconduct by Executive, the Company shall
indemnify Executive and hold him harmless from liability for acts or decisions made by him while
performing services for the Company if such indemnification is permitted by the Company's certificate
of incorporation and bylaws, including any future amendments. The Company shall use its best
efforts to obtain coverage for Executive under any insurance policy now in force or hereinafter
obtained during the term of this Agreement insuring officers and directors of the Company against
such liability.
20.
Assignment. This Agreement may not be assigned by either party without the prior
written consent of the other party.
21.
Stock Options. The Company's parent, Pinnacle Enfironmental, Inc. ("Pinnacle"), shall
issue to Executive options to purchase common stock under Pinnacle's 1989 Incentive Stock Option
and Stock Award Plan options to purchase common stock of Pinnacle as follows:
(a)
Pinnacle shall issue to Executive options to purchase an aggregate of
50,000 shares at any time on or before September 30, 1996, at an exercise price of $2.50 per
share, the approximate fair market price of Pinnacle common stock as quoted on the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Automated Quotation system ("NASDAQ") as of the date
hereof;
(b)
Pinnacle shall issue to Executive options to purchase an aggregate of
50,000 shares of Pinnacle common stock at any time on or before September 30, 1996, at a
purchase price of $2.50 per share; provided, that options with respect to 25,000 shares shall
expire on September 30, 1992, if at least one repackaging center is not opened and in operation
by such date, and further provided, that options for an additional 25,000 shares shall expire on
September 30, 1993, if Pinnacle has not opened and placed in operation one additional
repackaging center by such date; and
(c)
An option to purchase 5,000 shares of Pinnacle common stock at any time during a
five-year period at an exercise price equivalent to the bid price of the Pinnacle common stock in
the over-the-counter market as of the date of grant, for every repackaging center opened prior
to September 30, 1996, issuable on the date of such opening.
All options shall be subject to the terms and conditions of the incentive stock option plan and the
related form of option that is attached to such plan.
22.
Entire Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties
with respect to any written or oral negotiations, commitments, and understandings. No letter,
telegram, or other communication passing between the parties hereto shall be deemed a part of this
Agreement; nor shall a subsequent communication have the effect of modifying or adding to this
Agreement unless it is distinctly stated in such letter, telegram, or other communication that it is to
constitute a part of this Agreement and is signed by the parties to this Agreement.
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23.
Counterparts and Headings. This Agreement may be executed in two or more
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original and all of which together shall constitute one
and the same instrument. All headings in this Agreement are inserted for convenience or reference
and shall not affect the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement.
24.
Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance
with the laws of the state of Utah.
25.
Arbitration. In the event of a dispute or controversy between the parties as to the
provisions or performance of this Agreement, such dispute or controversy shall be submitted to
arbitration in accordance with the rules and procedures of the American Arbitration Association. The
Company and Executive shall each bear 50% of the third party costs of such arbitration.
26.
Severability. If and to the extent that any court of competent jurisdiction holds any
provision, or any part thereof, of this Agreement to be invalid or unenforceable, such holding shall in
no way affect the validity of the remainder of this Agreement.
27.
Waiver. No failure by any party to insist upon the strict performance of any covenant,
duty, agreement, or condition of this Agreement or to exercise any right or remedy consequent upon a
breach hereof shall constitute a waiver of any such breach, any subsequent breach of the same
obligation, or of any other covenant, agreement, term, or condition.
28.
Litigation Expenses. If any action, suit, or proceeding is brought by a party with respect
to a matter or matters governed by this Agreement, all costs and expenses of the prevailing party
incurred in connection with such proceeding, including reasonable attorneys' fees, shall be paid by the
nonprevailing party.
AGREED AND ENTERED INTO as of the date first above written.
THE COMPANY: ENVIRO PAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC.

)uly Authorized Officer

EXECUTIVE:
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